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ABSTRACT

The cost of enforcing patent rights is discouraging the small-entity inventor from
seeking out patent protection. The United States Patent and Trademark Office
favors the "small entity" by reducing fees, but the world of infringement litigation
offers no such discount. For the small entity, the costs related to asserting or
defending its patent rights against a well-funded adversary often exceed the benefits
of patent ownership. These inventors, in weighing the high costs of patent protection
against the potential profits, may simply choose to not patent their innovations.
Such a decision would deprive the public of the invention's disclosure and ultimately
contribute to defeating the purpose of the patent system. This comment proposes
several solutions to the financial dilemmas faced by small entities when evaluating
whether the benefits of disclosing an innovation are worth paying the often high
price of patent protection.
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DOES DAVID NEED A NEW SLING?
SMALL ENTITIES FACE A COSTLY BARRIER TO PATENT PROTECTION
JEFF A. RONSPIES*

INTRODUCTION

Small entities, unrecognized in the patent system until recently,1 have greatly
affected the growth of innovation in the United States. 2 But in today's legal
environment, small businesses and individual inventors holding patents are placed
at a significant disadvantage when their patents are challenged by large businesses.
3
In fact, many jurors share this opinion and sympathize accordingly in their findings.
Nonetheless, a patentee must expend vast sums of money and resources even before
it can plead its case before a jury. 4 For many small businesses and individual
inventors qualifying as "small entities, "5 the high cost of litigation can remove the
profitability of patent protection, thereby stifling innovation to the detriment of the
economy and the advancement of society.

* J.D. Candidate, January 2006, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Civil Engineering,
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, May 1995. Special thanks to my wife, Jenny, for
tolerating all of my complaining and supporting me throughout school.
I Congress required the USPTO to recognize small entities in 1982. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-247, § 1, 96 Stat. 317, 317.
2 H.R. REP. No. 102-382, at 13 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1320, 1328. While
Congress was considering lower fees for small entities, Jacob Rabinow, a rather prolific inventor,
testified that small inventors have a great impact on innovation and the economy:
In testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property
and Judicial Administration, Dr. Jacob Rabinow, an inventor and owner of 226
patents, cited numerous inventions for which independent inventors were
responsible. These include the invention of atomic energy, penicillin, microwave
technology, the FM radio, magnetic recording, holographfy, fiber optics, and
insulin.
Id. at 32 n.31.
3 Edmund L. Andrews, A 'White Knight' Draws Cries of PatentBlackmail,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1990, § 3, at 5. Juries "have proven eager to side with inventors against large companies." Id. A
survey conducted by a juror consultant firm found that most jurors idealize individual inventors and
consider them victimized by large firms. Nicholas M. Cannella & Timothy J. Kelley, Jury Trials and
Mock Jury Trials, in PATENT LITIGATION 1993, at 731, 741-42 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 375, 1993), availableatWL, 375 PLI/Pat 731. After a
jury awarded an individual inventor $110.5 million in an infringement case against General
Electric, the losing attorneys claimed the jury "acted on emotion, not facts or law." Jury Cases on
PatentInfringemont on Trial, CHI.TRIB., June 12, 1995, § 4, at 6.
See Am. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, 2003 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2003)
[hereinafter AIPLA 2003 REPORT]. In litigation involving patent infringement, each party incurs
between $290,000 and $2.5 million in legal fees just to complete the discovery process.
-d.
Moreover, the total cost of a patent infringement suit, including all costs incurred from filing to
adjudication, ranged between $500,000 and almost $4 million. Id.
"Small entity" is defined by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") in the
Code of Federal Regulations. 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) (2004). Small-entity status may be had by
individuals, "small business concern[s], or nonprofit organization[s]." Id. Small entities are entitled
to pay reduced fees to the USPTO. Id. § 1.27(b).
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One can easily imagine an individual inventor who devises an improvement that
benefits society. Consider John Q. Public, who, while using very few resources,
invents a tool in his spare time. Perhaps the tool increases productivity in Mr.
Public's trade or improves the safety level at which some task can be done-any
social value for which the patent system is intended to foster. For argument's sake,
6
Mr. Public's research and development costs should be considered negligible.
Subsequently, Mr. Public applies as a small entity to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") for a patent for his device, which is later granted.
Including the requisite filing, issuance and maintenance fees, he will spend $4,2857
s
to receive his patent and maintain its validity for the maximum statutory period
plus an additional $20,000, on average, in filing-related attorney fees. 9 Now suppose
that while Mr. Public is hard at work marketing his invention, X Corp, a large
corporation, sees the potential in Mr. Public's work and decides to infringe his patent.
Assuming that Mr. Public has a net annual income of $50,000, the legal cost to
defend his patent through the completion of discovery will cost approximately
$800,00010-sixteen times Mr. Public's net annual income-all before the device itself
has yielded any financial benefit.11 In contrast, assuming that X Corp has annual a

6 This is an extremely conservative assumption, considering that the cost of patent protection,
on average, is only 2.5 percent of the cost of research and development. Samson Vermont, The
Economics of Litigation, Part 2, available at http://www.palisade.com/html/articles/litigation.html
(last visited Nov. 09, 2004). On average, a large company spends $4.26 million in research and
development per patent. Id.
7 The basic costs for a small entity to file, have issued and maintain a patent with the USPTO
include $395 for the basic filing fee, 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1)(A), (h)(1) (2000), a $685 issue fee, id. §
41(a)(2), (h)(1), and $470, $1,075 and $1,660, respectively, at each maintenance period, id. § 41(b),
(h)(1), for a total of $4,285. In addition, if his patent application is published pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §
1.211 (2004), the applicant-regardless of his status as a small entity-must pay a $300 publication
fee before the USPTO will grant a patent. Id. § 1.18(d). If Mr. Public were to be required to pay
such a fee, his total expenditure would be $4,585.
8 Providing that the requisite maintenance fees, see supra note 7, are timely paid, the
maximum period of validity for a newly issued patent is twenty years from the date on which the
application was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1508
(2001).
10 Craig P. Opperman, Computer Technology Patents (with an Emphasis on Internet & E
Commerce Related Patents),in 20TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 1039, 1047 tbl. 1A (PLI
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 590, 2000), available
at WL, 590 PLI/Pat 1039 (stating that the costs of patent infringement litigation through the end of
discovery average $799,000).
11In order for a patentee to receive damages for infringement, there must be a demonstrable
economic demand" for the product covered by the patent. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. MaizeProds. Co., 979 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (N.D. Ind. 1997). Therefore, an invention must succeed before
the inventor can prevail economically in an infringement suit. See id. Furthermore, a patented
invention may not become economically successful until the patent terms is nearly expired. See also
John A. Reilly, Impact of the New Patent and TrademarkFee Bill: What Hath Been Wrought?, 65
J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 166, 173 (1983). See alsoJeffery E. Robertson, IfIt Ain't Broke Don'tFix It: The
UnnecessaryScope ofPatentReform as Embodied in the '21st Century PatentSystem Improvement
Act" and the "Omnibus Patent Act of 1997" 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 573, 580-89 (1998) (noting the
hardships a small entity faces when attempting to muster sufficient economic resources to file suit
against a large corporation). This has the effect of forcing the inventor in a long-term risk situation
if he cannot afford to protect his patent rights through litigation. Id.
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net annual income of $10 million, the large entity 12 suffers only an eight-percent dent
in its income as a result of the litigation. Thus, when weighing the cost to purchase
license rights against the cost of infringing, X Corp need only calculate Mr. Public's
ability to fund legal representation and his probability of success. While an attorney
may defend Mr. Public on a contingency basis, that cost, if Mr. Public prevails, likely
will be added to the cost of the device and could make the device unprofitable (if
margins are small). Furthermore, even if Mr. Public is victorious, many of his
litigation costs will not be considered by the court when calculating damages. 13 This
set of circumstances frustrates the purpose of the patent system and discourages Mr.
Public from disclosing his device.
While "asymmetrical" parties may create inequities in all areas of law, patent
law is unique in that its purpose is to create a shield to foster a social benefit, not to
14
provide a sword to be wielded to discourage wrongdoing or to reduce a social cost.
Patent law serves to encourage social growth by protecting one party through the
temporary exclusion of others.15 In contrast, tort law, for example, attempts to
16
encourage socially-responsible behavior by holding everyone to the same standard.
Thus, unlike patent law, tort law exists to be used as a sword, thrust at others to
vanquish inequities.
This comment discusses the disadvantages faced by many small entities under
the current patent law and proposes several solutions. The Background section
begins with a brief discussion of the evolution of modern patent law, the ways in
which it currently affects small entities and congressional efforts to maintain an
increasing level of small-entity innovation through protective legislation. The
Analysis section describes how the costs incurred by small entities in seeking to
obtain patent protection, including application filing costs, litigation costs and
intangible costs, often place such entities at a significant disadvantage in today's
economy. Finally, the Proposal discusses several measures to counteract the loss of
innovation that may result if large entities continue to dominate the patent system.

I. BACKGROUND
The protection of technical innovations has been recognized for centuries as
beneficial to society.17 Traditionally, the American system has provided protection to
patentees by imposing monetary damages on infringers without distinguishing

12 Soo 37 § C.F.R. 1.27 (2004) (defining "small entity").

For purposes of this comment, a large

entity shall be defined as all entities not within the limits set by 37 § C.F.R. 1.27.
13 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) (denying attorneys fees in all but the "exceptional case"); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1821(b) (2000) (providing in-court witnesses with an attendance fee of $40 per day,
including expert witnesses).
1' See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In
more narrow consideration, a patent can be used both offensively, as a sword, and defensively, as a
shield. Id.
15See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
16VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1 (10th ed. 2000).

17See generallyGiles Sutherland Rich, The "Exclusive Right" Since Aristotle, 14 FED. CIR. B.J.
217 (2004).
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between parties of disparate economic leverage. 18 However, at the risk of frustrating
the very purpose for which our patent system exists, such a distinction is required. 19
In 1982, Congress attempted to alleviate some of the economic disparity in the patent
20
system by formally recognizing the small entity.

A. A BriefHistory ofPatentLaw

1. The EarlyHistory ofPatentLaw
Laws designed to protect useful inventions, usually attributed to the English
system, can be traced back as far as ancient Greece, where exceptional recipes were
granted special status. 21 Renaissance Italy protected unique weavings of textile
artisans. 22 Little is known, however, of the damages available to those whose
innovation was copied by another. 23 But if the inventor was a "little guy," his
protection was enforced by the state and presumably required little in the way of
24
operating funds to deter would-be infringers.
Granting a monopoly to a patent holder was probably not perceived as a
negative market influence in Ancient Greece or Renaissance Europe. 25 The issue was
considered, however, when the English Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies
in 1623 to place limits on the creation of monopolies and mitigate the effects of those
then in existence. 26 A time limit of fourteen years was instituted to balance the
18See 35
'9

U.S.C. § 284 (2000).

Soo H.R. REP. No. 102-382, at 13 (1991), roprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1320,

1328.
The small entity fee structure is important to encourage innovation in the United
States. Small entities file approximately 34 percent of all patent applications in
the United States. Independent inventors account for 72 percent of these small
entities, and if fees increased dramatically, they would be disinclined to protect
their inventions because of a lack of resources. Yet, the independent inventor has
fueled America's technological innovation-benefiting all the American people,
including the larger industries that rely on their innovation.

Id.
20 Congress required the USPTO to recognize small entities in 1982. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-247, § 1, 96 Stat. 317, 317.
21 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:1, at 7 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter WALKER ON PATENTS]. In the 3rd century BC, the Greek historian Phylarchos wrote
that the rulers of the Greek city of Sybaris issued patents for unique recipes. Id.
22 WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C. COLLINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 65 (4th
ed. 1995). By 1432, the Senate of Venice had enacted a statute granting an exclusive privilege on a
silk-making invention for a ten-year period. Id.
23 One account sets the Venetian penalty for copying a device at ten ducats and destruction of
the device. Rich, supra note 17, at 219.
24 Soo id. At the inventor's request, an alleged infringer was "summoned before" the
city magistrate, where fines were levied. Id.
25WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 21, at 5-6. Monopolies were not viewed adversely by the
work guilds, which were formed to limit competition for the purpose of job security. Id.
26 Sir William Jarratt, English Patent System, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 761 (1944) (citing Statute
of Monopolies, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3, § 6 (1623) (Eng.).
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innovator's right to market dominance with the long-term health of the market. 27
The fourteen-year shield provided by the Crown allowed the holder of a monopolytoday's patent holder-to gain economic strength as a result of being free of
competitors. Thereafter, upon losing that protection, the erstwhile monopolist would
28
have the economic means to compete with established competitors.

2. PatentLawin the United States

a. ProtectingInnovations to EncourageIngenuity
Many of the original colonies enacted patent protection measures. 29 However, as
the Constitution was drafted, the majority of the Framers perceived the need for a
national system to protect innovations.30 Originally, even the accomplished inventor,
Thomas Jefferson, opposed monopolies of any kind, including patents. 31 Jefferson
went so far as to urge an amendment to the Constitution-to be included as one of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights-to restrict monopolies in the United States. 32 At
that time, Jefferson did not accept the argument that limited monopolies actually
serve to encourage ingenuity: "[Tihe benefit even of limited monopolies is too
doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression."3 3 Jefferson's opposition,
34
however, later subsided.

27 WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 21, § 1:2, at 13-14.

In England, complaints against

monopolies first were addressed in 1610 when King James I condemned monopolies and declared
that patents would only be granted for "projects of new invention so that they be not contrary to the
law, nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or
generally inconvenient." Id. Further complaints of favoritism by the Crown led to the Statute of
Monopolies in 1624, which permitted monopolies of only limited duration. Id.
28 Id. The Statute of Monopolies provided an exemption from the state's ban on any monopoly.
Id.
29WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 21, § 1:7, at 50-53. In 1641, the colony of Massachusetts
granted a "patent" for a salt-making process, the first recorded patent in the colonies. Id. at 52. In
1716, a South Carolina inventor was honored with an "[a]ct for the due Encouragement of Dr.
William Crook" after he blended tar with other ingredients to seal wood against rot. LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 255 (2d ed. 1985). In 1787, the State of New York granted
to John Fitch the sole and exclusive right to make and use steam-driven boats within New York
waters. WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 21, § 1:7, at 50-51. Later, the State repealed the patent
to Fitch and instead granted it to Robert R. Livingston; an action which, after ratification of the
constitution, culminated in the legendary case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 21, § 1:7, at 50-51.
'30
The first Patent Act was enacted by Congress on April 10, 1790. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS at OV-3 (2004).
'3'See Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966).
32 See Id.
:' 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 545 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995). Jefferson had written James
Madison expressing his desire to restrict "all monopolies, even limited monopolies." 2 DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 282 (1951).
34 MALONE, supra note 33, at 282.

[4:184 2004]

Does David Need a New Sling?

With little debate, the states unanimously agreed to the Patent Clause on the
same day it was proposed.5 The Patent Clause provides that "The Congress shall
have Power .. .To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."3 6 Shortly after the Constitution was ratified by the states,
7
Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1793.3

A. MandatingDamages to DiscourageInfringement
The Patent Act of 1793 provided for specific damages to discourage infringement
and protect inventors.38 However, the 1793 Act did not contain any provisions
specifically designed to protect the "little guy." 39 Today, an infringer deemed liable
for infringement typically must pay at least a reasonable royalty to the patent
holder. 40 Moreover, in any given case, but especially one-such as that illustrated by

35EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN
PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 49 (1998). On September 5, 1787, a "Committee
of Detail" comprised of Constitutional Convention attendees approved the current language of the
Patent Clause. Id. It is possible that the lack of pre-approval debate can be attributed to the fact
that less than one month prior, on August 20, 1787, many of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention were in Philadelphia, attending inventor John Fitch's demonstration of the steamboat.
Id. at 42-43.
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.
'37Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). "[T]he requisite nine states"
ratified the Constitution on June 21, 1788. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 35, at 8 & n.18.
'38Id. at 322.
31See id.
40 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). Two options are available for a patent owner seeking monetary
relief: lost profits or a reasonable royalty. Id. In the aggregate, lost profits are the amount of money
that the patent owner lost due to the infringement. JOHN M. SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:3 (2003). A reasonable royalty is equated to the cost of a license to produce
the product, had one been negotiated. See, e.g., DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1140,
1148 (N.D.Cal. 2003). Lost profits are generally the greater amount of the two options, but the
patent owner must prove that the infringement caused the lost profits. SKENYON ET AL, supra.
Without such proof, the damages are calculated using a reasonable royalty. Id. Providing evidence
of lost profits can be elusive and costly, often requiring the testimony of expert economics witnesses.
Id. at § 1:7.
While lost profits claims are potentially lucrative, patent owners should bear
in mind that proof of the existence and amount of lost profits can be complex and
difficult, because an in-depth economic analysis is generally required. A patent
owner's failure to account for the economics that dictate lost profits will often
result in a denial of such an award, as courts have become increasingly aware of
the economics underlying lost profits damages. Thus, the patent owner must take
care to ensure that its lost profits case is well grounded in sound economic
principles.
Id. One commentator finds reasonable royalties an insufficient measure of damages, even without
willful infringement:
The only risk to the 'thief is they may have to pay a reasonable royalty out of the
profit if the patent issues. The current speed of technological development often
means that the only profitable period is the initial marketing of the product
because something will quickly come along that is better, faster, and cheaper.
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John Q. Public's patent and X Corp-involving willful infringement, treble damages
may be awarded. 4 1 By definition, treble damages exceed what would be considered a
reasonable royalty. 42 In fact, in certain situations, treble damages have the affect of
rewarding a party far in excess of its actual losses. 43 At the time at which they were
first introduced in the United States, in the Patent Act of 1793, treble damages set
only a minimum penalty for infringement. 44 The treble-damages provision of the
1793 Act was included to counteract the expectation of the time that anti-patent
juries would award only minimal damages. 45 In 1800, the requirement of treble
damages in the 1793 Act was changed from a minimum to the required award. 46 The
Patent Act of 1836 again revised the damages requirement to limit the maximum
award to three times the judgment, at the court's discretion. 47 Currently an optional
maximum award, treble damages generally are imposed by a court only when a
patentee can prove some form of willful infringement 48 or behavior that violates the
antitrust laws.

49

John B. Campbell, Jr., What's the Deal Now? A Business Perspective Analysis of the US. Patent
System and Recent Changes to the Patent Laws, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 293, 316 (2002). A
patent owner who has not begun manufacture of his invention is precluded from obtaining lost
profits damages, because two parties must compete in the same marketplace for a lost profit to exist.
SKENYON ET AL, supra, § 1:7. A patent owner with a small market share, typical of individual
inventors, may be awarded lost profits only to the extent of their market share. Id. This limitation
does not acknowledge the expansion an individual or small business could have funded by growing
sales within a limited market.
4135 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). A "court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed," id., when it finds evidence of willful infringement. See, e.g., Goodwall Constr.
Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 991 F.2d 751, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Generally, treble damages are defined
as "damages given by statute in certain types of cases, consisting of the single damages found by the
jury, actually tripled in amount." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990).
42 See 35 U.S.C. § 284. "[S]pecific royalt[ies] in a specific case [are determined] by way of the
hypothetical negotiation process." DSUMed. Corp., 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. It is unlikely that a
reasonable negotiation would lead to an agreement for payment equating to three times the true
market value of a given technology.
43 Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 788 F.2d 1536, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(stating that a "treble damages award is by definition largely in excess of the actual injury").
41Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836). The Patent Act of 1790
included a provision awarding only "such damages as shall be as-sessed [sic] by a jury." Ch. 7, § 4, 1
Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
45WALTERSCHEID, supra note 35, at 210. The minimum treble damages award set by the
Patent Act of 1793 partially was a product of lobbying efforts by Joseph Barnes, id at 228, the patent
attorney for steamboat innovator James Rumsey, idat 209 n.41.
46Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (repealed 1836).
47Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (repealed 1870) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2000)). Only damages may be enhanced; attorney fees and expert witness fees, if
awarded, may not be multiplied. Id. A two step analysis is essential when a court is determining
whether to increase damages: the fact-finder must determine (1) whether the infringement was
willful, and (2) whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, some multiplier less than
three should be used. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
48 Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 166-67 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding willful infringement and awarding treble damages as a result of the defendant's failure to
obtain a validity and infringement opinion after becoming aware of the plaintiffs patent); see also
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (noting that treble damages are
appropriate when an "infringer act[s] in wanton disregard of the patentee's patent rights"),

[4:184 2004]

Does David Need a New Sling?

Despite providing to certain plaintiffs what may be a compensatory windfall, the
intent of the treble damages doctrine is not necessarily to make the owner of the
patent once again "whole," but to punish the defendant. 50 Consistent with that
intent, under certain circumstances, even treble damages do not properly compensate
the patentee whose patent rights have been violated. 51 The same may continue to
hold true despite an additional award of attorney fees. Essentially, when considering
all of the costs involved in obtaining and protecting a patent, it is at times impossible
for an award of even treble damages to make the patentee truly wholenotwithstanding the fact that the doctrine in its modern form is not meant to serve
52
such a purpose.

B. The Purpose ofPatentProtection
Modern governmental protection of patents serves to provide an environment in
which a patentee can profit from his invention free of competition. 53 In return for
this protection, the inventor must disclose his innovation to the public. 54 The social

abrogatedin part on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc); Goodwall Constr. Co. v. Beers Constr. Co., 991 F.2d 751, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("A finding of willfulness justifies, but does not compel, an award of [treble] damages."); Beatrice
Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding
that the Federal Circuit expressly forbids considering the inadequacy of damages when deciding
willfulness).
49 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965) (permitting recovery of treble damages pursuant to § 15 after finding that
the defendant committed fraud against the USPTO in the procurement of a patent and
concomitantly violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
50 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03(4)(b)(ii) (2002) ("It is true, where the
injury is wanton or malicious, a jury may inflict vindictive or exemplary damages, not to recompense
the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant." (quoting Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 flow.) 480,
489 (1853))).
,5l For example, an award of treble damages may not fully reimburse a small business or
individual inventor whose legal fees incurred during a drawn-out legal battle exceed the modest
profit made on a product.
52 CHISUM, supra note 50. The Federal Circuit has held that the damages are not based simply
on the profits made by the infringer, but on the increase in profit gained by the infringement from
the next available non-infringing technology. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185
F.3d. 1341, 1349-53 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In the calculation of the award, therefore, the market value of
a patented technology is significantly reduced unless no there is no alternative technology that the
infringer could have improved upon. Id.
53 See General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (referring to a patent as a government-granted 'monopoly'). A patent grants the patentee "the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). Therefore, by implication, only the patentee has the
inverse right to freely engage in those acts from which he may exclude others. See id. However,
some would assert that a patent "gives you a government grant which is little more than a right to
litigate." Ronald Zibelli & Steven D. Glazer, An Interview with Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager, 5 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 6 (1993).
51 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Disclosure can be achieved by use or knowledge by others, or
description in a printed publication more than a year before application. Id.
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benefit is reaped when other inventors build upon the disclosure of the innovation
55
and thereby "promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."

C. Small Entities in the American PatentSystem
Contributions by small businesses and individual inventors have had a
56
significant impact on the pace of innovation and the progress of science.
"II]nventions by independent inventors and small companies are not trivial. Over
half of the sixty-one most important innovations of the 20th century came from
independent inventors or small firms."5 7 However, compared to large corporations,
when small-business enterprises and individual inventors enter into litigation in
58
attempt to enforce their patent rights, such parties are often at a disadvantage.
After Congress introduced periodic patent maintenance fees in 198059 and
substantially increased "filing, processing, maintenance and issue fees" in 1982,60

55U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. One of the Supreme Court's earliest patent decisions stated
that the purpose of a patent was to provide a reward that would stimulate people to exert
themselves to try to make inventions. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832). A
later Court elaborated, stating that patent laws are enacted in the hope that "t]he productive effort
thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment
and better lives for our citizens." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
[Patents] are not to be regarded as monopolies . . . but as public franchises
granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements . . . as a matter of
compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expertise in making the
inventions .. .as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws of
Congress.
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (1 Wall.) 516, 533-34 (1870).
56 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting several important technologies discovered
by independent inventors).

,7 Christopher R. Balzan, Comment, Mandatory Publication of Patent Applications Prior to
Issuance of Patents.'A Desirable Change in US. Policy?, 18 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP. L.J. 143, 16061 (1995). Small and medium sized businesses produced approximately 75% of the Gross National
Product in 1999. Id.at 151. Another study found that "small entities (mostly individuals and small
businesses) patent a large number of mechanical inventions and medical devices, but a very small
percentage of most other sorts of inventions." John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting
What? An Empirical Exploration of PatentProsecution,53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2102 (2000). This
distribution is most likely due to the lower research and development costs required for mechanical
inventions. Id. at 2129. In the same study, a random sampling of patents found that over one-third
of those were mechanical inventions. Id. at 2113. However, the same study found that only 29% of
patents in the sample were filed under the small entity classification. Id. at 2117. Of those in the
small entity category, 36% were small businesses, 60% were individuals and 4% were non-profit
organizations. Id. at 2117. The average small entity listed 1.67 inventors per patent, while the
average large entity listed 2.5 inventors per patent. Id. at 2143.

5sSee, e.g., Del Jones, Businesses Battle over Intellectual Property: Courts Choked with
Lawsuits to Protect Ideas and Profits, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2000, at 1B ("Patent lawsuits can be
,really life threatening to small start-ups' that can't afford to defend themselves." (quoting Joe
Chung, Chairman and Chief Technology Officer of Art Technology Group, Inc.)).
59Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 2, 94 Stat. 3015, 3017-18 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 41). The 1980 legislation was enacted at a time when Congress was concerned with
overseas competition. 126 CONG. REC. 12,895 (1980). Ostensibly, the bill "represent[ed] an effort to
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Congress became concerned with the plight of small businesses and individual
inventors. 61 Accordingly, as part of the 1982 legislation, Congress reduced many of
the USPTO fees applicable to small entities. 62 As such, Congress formally recognized
63
the economic disparities faced by many small entities.
The reduced fee amendment applied to three classes of applicants deemed to
qualify as small entities: independent inventors, nonprofit organizations and small
business concerns. 64
Congress required the USPTO to establish regulations
governing how independent inventors and nonprofit organizations would qualify as
parties entitled to enjoy reduced fees. 65 In addition, the USPTO was required to
adhere to the definition of "small business concerns" previously established by the

reverse the . . . decline in U.S. productivity by strengthening the patent and copyright system .
Id. at 29,895.
60 Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 1, 96 Stat. 317, 317.
61 See Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
"Concerned that [the 1982] legislation would be overly burdensome to individuals, non-profit
organizations and smaller businesses, Congress provided a discount for small entities."
Id.
However, even prior to 1982, during the debates on the 1980 amendments, there was congressional
concern as to the effect of continuing fee increases on small businesses. See 126 CONG. REC. 29,900
(1980). As one congressman stated:
I am concerned that if inventors who are not with large corporations but are on
their own come up with some new expertise or new technology, that they may not
be in a position to afford to patent that idea ... I am concerned about independent
inventors or small businessmen who will apply for patents in the future. If they
cannot afford to pay the increase [sic] fee, will we be preventing them from
helping us to develop new technologies that will enable the United States to
compete with other nations?
Id. (statement of Rep. Miller). On March 3, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the
"United States Patent and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003." H.R. 1561, 108th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 2(e) (2004). If approved by the Senate and passed into law, the Act would further reduce
small entity filing fees by another fifty percent for those filing electronically. Id. However, in
addition to further reducing fees, the Act requires the USPTO and the Small Business
Administration to conduct a joint study to determine the effect of patent fees on the ability of small
entity inventors to file patent applications and the need for continuing the current policy of reduced
fees for small entities. Id. § 2(Q).
62 Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 1, 96 Stat. 317, 317.
6 See id. Regardless of any economic disparities, some feel that the small entity classification
is unnecessary, asserting that the criteria for reduced fees is "necessarily arbitrary, and thus both
unfair to, and a deterrent to innovation by those companies who fail to satisfy the arbitrary
standard." Committee Reports to be Presentedat the Annual Meeting to be held July 28-August 4,
1983, Atlanta, Georgia, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. REP. 270. Additionally,
"it unavoidably creates paperwork and distracting side issues in the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications . . . and it raise[s] issues subject to potential collateral attack in infringement
proceedings." Id.
61Act of Aug. 27, 1982 § 1.
6 Id. USPTO regulations define an independent inventor as "any inventor or other individual
(e.g., an individual to whom an inventor has transferred some rights in the invention) who has not
assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed, and is under no obligation under contract or law to assign,
grant, convey, or license, any rights in the invention." 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1) (2004). Nonprofit
organizations include "university[ies] or other institution[s] of higher education," tax-exempt
organizations, and "nonprofit scientific or educational organization[s]." Id. § 1.27(a)(3).
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66
regulations of another federal agency, the Small Business Administration ("SBA").
Under the SBA's definition, small business concerns are those companies having 500
or fewer employees. 67 In 1986, small-entity fee structure of the 1982 amendment was
68
made permanent.

II. ANALYSIS
In acting to reduce USPTO fees for small entities, Congress recognized the
importance of protecting such parties' inventive contributions to society. 69 As
Congress itself pointed out, reduced fees may serve the general purpose of
encouraging small entities to disclose their innovations. 0 However, unfortunately
for small entities, the fees required by the USPTO constitute only a small percentage
71
of the costs all too often required to enforce the rights conveyed by a patent grant.
Moreover, lower filing costs alone seemingly do little to mitigate potentially the
largest drain on a small entity's resources: the often staggering costs of patent
72
litigation.
66 Act of Aug. 27, 1982 § 1. Among other responsibilities, the SBA is perhaps best known for its
role in providing federal financial aid to small businesses. See generally 13 C.F.R. §§ 119.1, .3,
120.2, .100 (2004). The SBA was created by Congress in 1953 to further the policy that
the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the
interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive
enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or
subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but not
limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be
placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total
sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and
strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.
15 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000).
6713 C.F.R. § 121.802(a) (2004). A small business concern is defined as:
any business concern that: (i) [h]as not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed,
and is under no obligation under contract or law to assign, grant, convey, or
license, any rights in the invention to any person, concern, or organization which
would not qualify for small entity status as a person, small business concern, or
nonprofit organization; and (ii) [m]eets the size standards set forth in 13 CFR
121.801 through 121.805 to be eligible for reduced patent fees.
37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(2) (2004).
68 Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-607, § 1(b)(2), 100 Stat. 3470, 3470 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2000)).
Fees charged under [35 U.S.C. § 41] (a) or (b) shall be reduced by 50 percent with
respect to their application to any small business concern as defined under section
3 of the Small Business Act, and to any independent inventor or nonprofit
organization as defined in regulations issued by the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks.
Id. § 1(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 3470.
69 See H.R. REP. No. 102-382, at 13 (1991), reprintedin1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1320, 1328.
70 d

71This becomes apparent if the average cost of filing a patent application, see supra note 7
($4,285), is taken as a percentage of the lowest average cost of patent litigation through discovery,
see supra note 4 ($290,000), in which case the result indicates that the average cost of filing a patent
application equates to only 1.48% of the average cost of litigation.
72 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the average costs of patent litigation).
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The largest cost potentially contributing to diminished innovation amongst
small entities is that of the legal actions often required to protect, enforce and
ultimately recoup the sunk costs invested in the patent. 73 In addition to the legal
costs associated with patent ownership, this section discusses the filing costs and
other less-tangible costs related to patent protection. When viewed in the aggregate,
it is not difficult to understand how these costs could easily cut the economic thread
from which often hangs the very existence of many small patentees.
The unchecked growth of a significant economic disparity between small-entity
patentees and large, corporate innovators may create an impression among small
businesses and individual inventors that the costs necessary to protect a patent will
far exceed the profits expected from the commercialized invention. The net result of
such a cost-benefit analysis ultimately leads to a reduction in the number of
innovations disclosed by small inventors. Thus, this section concludes by arguing
that instead of patenting, these important contributors to economic development may
turn to other forms of protection-such as trade secrets-which cost little to maintain
74
but provide negligible benefits to society.

A. Filing Costs
In general, small businesses and individuals are eligible to pay reduced filing
and issue fees to the USPTO. 75 Additionally, renewal fees, which must be paid at
three statutorily-set times to maintain a patent's status as enforceable,7 6 also have
been reduced for small entities. 77 The basic lifetime cost for a simple utility patent
timely filed by a small entity is $4,285, which is probably not a barrier, by itself, to
78
obtaining a patent.

73

Sunken costs include research, manufacturing, testing, and patent application costs, among

other costs that are incurred prior to earning any income from the product.
74 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 43 (1998). As Judge Posner stated:
[Maintaining a trade secret] is frequently an alternative to patenting. A
manufacturer who is confident that he can keep his manufacturing process a
secret for longer than the period for which he could protect it by a patent may
decide to rely on trade secrecy law and forego seeking a patent. He will save costs
and avoid the uncertainties of the patent route; and he will not have to disclose
the process, as he would in a patent application, thereby enabling his competitors
to duplicate it once the patent expires.

Id.
7535 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2000).
76 Id. § 41(b). Maintenance fees are due at 3 1/2, 7 1/2 and 11 1/2 years from the date that the
patent is issued. Id.
77 Id. § 41(h)(1).
78 See supranote 7 and accompanying text (discussing the basic costs for a small entity to file,
have issued and maintain a patent with the USPTO).
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B. Litigation Costs
A patent provides its holder with a negative right7 9 to exclude others from
making, selling, using and importing the claimed invention.8 0 This negative right
must be enforced privately, usually funded by the patentee's own financial
resources. 8 1 Litigation costs can impose on the small entity a great burden in the
event that it must enforce a patent.8 2 This especially is true in the case of a patent
8 3
covering a promising technology which has been infringed prior to profitability
Two notable examples of such costly litigation involve the inventors of the airplane
and intermittent windshield wipers; both demonstrate the effect of a firm's eroding
profits as a result of funds being diverted to pay legal fees.8 4 Wilbur Wright bitterly
complained to his patent attorney that the incessant delays of the litigation process
85
were destroying the economic value of his and his brother's infringed-upon patent,
which, unsurprisingly, claimed an improved airplane design.8 6 Robert Kearns,
inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper in 1963, attempted to license his
invention to Ford Motor Company.8 7 Ford ignored Kearns's offer and chose instead
simply to infringe on his patent.88 After Kearns filed suit, Ford stalled the litigation,
allegedly in an attempt to outspend Kearns.8 9 By the time Kearns ultimately
obtained his second favorable judgment, he had spent $10 million in legal fees. 90
The American court system is designed to dispose of frivolous lawsuits 91 and
claims based on insufficient facts 92 early in the litigation process, and a court may
79 See, e.g., Chi. & Alton Ry. Co. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 F. 883, 890 (7th Cir. 1917)
(stating that "a patent conveys nothing but a negative right of exclusion").
80 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000) ("Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention ..
").
SI See 35 U.S.C. § 281 ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his

patent.").
82 See AIPLA 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
83 See, e.g., James V. Grimaldi, After Historie Flight, Wrights Went to Court, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 2003, at E01 (discussing the Wright brothers' involvement in 30 years of patent litigation
'over [an infringement of] their [patented] discovery that 'warping' of an aircraft's wings made
powered flight possible"); John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 1993, at 38,
44-45 (discussing the saga of Robert Kearns's disputed patent on intermittent windshield wipers).
81 Grimaldi, supra note 83; Seabrook, supra note 83.
85 Grimaldi, supra note 83. Prior to Wilbur Wright's death from typhoid fever in 1912, he was
involved in litigation to protect his airplane design. Id. Wright's last letter to his patent attorney
complained about how long the case was taking:
Unnecessary delays by stipulation of counsel have already destroyed fully three
fourths of the value of our patent ... The opportunities of the last two years will
never return again. At the present moment almost innumerable competitors are
entering the field, and for the first time are producing machines which will really
fly.
Id.
86 See U.S. Pat. No. 821,393 (issued May 22, 1906).
87 Seabrook, supranote 83.
88 d
89 Id.

at 49.
Week In Review, No Shortage of Saviors, WASH. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at A14
(discussing Kearns's $11.3 million jury verdict against Chrysler Corp.).
9' See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
92 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
90 The
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impose sanctions on attorneys who file such suits. 93 However, in general, parties are
provided with ample opportunities to amend their legal claims 94 and appeal adverse
findings. 95 While these basic elements are essential to the well-being of our system of
justice, the benefits of each usually cannot be fully realized absent representation by
experienced counsel-which includes what are often substantial legal fees-before a
final judgment is rendered. According to one study, less than seven percent of patent
suits litigate through trial, but only about twenty-five percent of suits settle without
any court action whatsoever. 96 Therefore, a small business or inventor attempting to
defend an infringed patent almost certainly will be forced to expend at least some
litigation costs-this in addition to the preliminary costs and expert fees usually
required to move for a pre-trial judgment. 97 Yet, a small inventor may be intimidated
by any amount of legal fees required to defend a patent, particularly when an
opponent has the ability to easily outspend the small inventor. In fact, another
survey concluded that small companies are less likely to litigate to protect their
patents even though many small companies believe that their patents are infringed
98
upon at a higher frequency than those held by large corporations.
An average litigation cost of $2 million presents a significant barrier to a small
business's or individual inventor's ability to adequately represent itself in a lawsuit. 99
An attorney defending a small entity's patent rights on a contingency basis may help
to alleviate the impact of litigation on the entity's finances. However, a device which
has not yet been successful in the marketplace, or an innovation whose expected
profits are small, will not provide a sufficiently powerful incentive for the attorney to
gamble his time. 100 Furthermore, many patent attorneys consider small businesses

93 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
91See FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
9" 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (providing jurisdiction to the federal "courts of appeals (other than
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) [as to] appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States."); id. § 1295(a)(1) (2000) (providing jurisdiction to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as to "appeal[s] from a final decision of a district
court of the United States . . . if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
section 1338."). In pertinent part, § 1338 provides federal "district courts [with] original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents." 35 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
96 Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-an EmpiricalPeek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 384 (2001). Almost seventy-six percent of patent suits settle before trial.
Id.
97 See AIPLA 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
98 Josh Lerner, The Patent System and Competition, at 4, at http://www.fte.gov/opp/
intellect/lernerjosh.pdf (last visited Nov. 09, 2004). In a 1990 survey of 376 companies, the cost to
litigate was a factor for twice as many "small entities" as large companies. Id.
99 AIPLA 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
100Randy Myers, Fighting Words: Growing Ranks of Litigants are Putting a Price Tag on
Ideas, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 1998, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/2989975.html (last
visited Nov. 09, 2004). While most law firms bill patent litigation on an hourly basis, some are
willing to represent clients on a contingency basis. Id. A sliding scale may be used, "perhaps 10
percent of the recovery if the case is settled without initiating litigation, 25 percent if the case is
settled before it goes to discovery ....
33 percent if the discovery stage is reached, and 40 percent
once it goes to expert discovery." Id.; see also Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE
RECORDER, July 30, 2001, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=
ZZZ4DX7MSPC (last visited Nov. 09, 2004) (reporting contingency fees for patent litigation reaching
as high as forty-five percent).
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and individuals less sophisticated clients, requiring more of the attorney's time to
handle the patent litigation process than would a larger, corporate innovator.' 0 '
In patent cases, as in many other civil cases, attorneys are free to represent
clients on a contingency basis.' 0 2 While this option may be appealing to both clients

03
and attorneys involved in suits where the damages at issue are simple to assess,
damages in patent cases are more difficult to calculate. 0 4 Furthermore, absent an
equitable accounting, 0 5 patentees who seek only an injunction against manufacture
or who only wish to bar an infringer's sales of the patented product are entitled to
little in monetary damages. 0 6 In such cases, the contingency attorney may be forced
to rely for compensation on the future profits expected from the invention, surely a
less palatable alternative than representing a client with readily available funds.
One patent attorney recommends both an infringement opinion and a validity
opinion from a first attorney before seeking representation by a second attorney on a

contingency basis. 10 7

The cost of these opinions, estimated at a minimum of $8,750,

must be borne by the inventor. 108 Such opinions serve as a type of inventor's patent
prospectus on which contingency attorneys can assess their likelihood of success and
agree to-or decline-representation. 0 9 Even if an attorney agrees to engage in
representation on a contingency basis, the inventor usually is expected to pay
ancillary costs, such as those for depositions, travel expenses and evidentiary
exhibits." 0 These costs, at minimum, have been estimated in the range of $10,000.111

101 See Harry I. Moatz, Avoiding Misconduct Complaints in PatentProsecution,2003 VA. BAR
AsS'N, INTELL. PROP. & INFO. TECH. L. SEC. 69, 72. An attorney representing a client before the
USPTO has a duty to meet a client's reasonable expectations, including education of the client. Id.
102 Soe, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2003) ("A fee may be contingent on

the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered ....
").
103 Soo, e.g., Cathey v. Meyer, 115 S.W.3d 644, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (Gray, J., dissenting)
("The [damages] calculation is deceptively simple: determine the value as represented, deduct from
that the value actually received, and voil4--the amount of damages.").
101
Soo Jack L. Slobodin & Seyfarth Shaw, Examining Damages Experts in Patent Litigation,
in PATENT LITIGATION 2003, at 667, 669 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course, Handbook Series No. 766, 2003), available atWL, 766 PLI/Pat 667.
105 "An equitable accounting is a remedy of restitution where a . . . defendant is forced to
'disgorge gains received from the improper use of the plaintiffs property or entitlements."' Gov't
Guarantee Fund of Republic of Fin. v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 466 (D.V.I. 1997) (quoting 1
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(5), at 610 (2d ed. 1993)).
106 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000); Nat'l Dryer Mfg. Corp. v. Dryer Co. of Am., 130 F. Supp. 912,
913 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ('[T]he remedy of damages provided in [35 U.S.C. §] 284 is a separate and
distinct remedy from the injunctive relief which is authorized in [35 U.S.C. §] 283."). If an attorney
hired on a contingency basis were to be successful in enjoining an infringer's production and sales of
a patented product, the success would be somewhat hollow given that, absent an equitable
accounting, there would be no award of damages from which to extract a commission.
107 John P. Costello, Patent Enforcement with Teeth, INVENTORS DIG., May 1, 1999,
available at https://w255.securedweb.net/inventorsdigest/wwwfp/magazine/freearticles/enforce.html
(last visited Nov. 09, 2004).
108 Id.
The average cost of an infringement opinion is $5,000, and the average cost of a validity
opinion is $3,750. Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111

Id.
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A prevailing party in an infringement suit rarely is awarded attorney fees. 112 As
such, much like Robert Kearns, small-entity patentees may find themselves granted
an award of lost profits only to see it equaled or exceeded by the costs incurred
during litigation. 113 Even when attorney fees are granted, the fees often are reduced
by the court, leaving either the attorney or the prevailing client responsible for the
shortcoming. 114 Adding to the disincentive that exists for an attorney to represent a
small client, fee collection also may be considered more difficult when a smaller, less
115
financially stable client is involved.

C. Other Costs
Beyond filing fees and the costs of litigating infringements, additional costs often
factor into patent ownership, all serving to financially overwhelm the small entity
patent holder. A thorough novelty search, while effective at reducing the potential
for future litigation, is a costly form of patent "insurance"; moreover, it ultimately
may insure nothing at all. 116 Viewed in that light, the $1,500 average cost for a
novelty search may lead small inventors to simply forego such searches.1 17 Other
costs that can reduce the incentive to enter the patent system and disclose an
innovation include the cost of drafting the patent application, lost opportunity costs,
118
the temporary losses of financial and intellectual capital, and even interest costs.
112 Attorney fees will not be awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 285 except as necessary to prevent
gross injustice or in cases where fraud and wrong-doing are clearly proven. Maurice A. Garbell, Inc.
v. Boeing Co., 546 F.2d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1963).
113Seabrook, supranote 83, at 38.
'I
See, e.g., Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l, Inc., Nos. 03-7090(L), 03-7249(XAP), 2004 WL
2361656, at *14-16 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2004) (affirming a nearly thirty percent reduction in plaintiffs'
requested attorney fees from $1.6 million by amounts of $167,866 (reduction of attorneys' requested
hourly rates), $215,279 (reduction for attorneys' time spent on unsuccessful claims), $45,575
(reduction for unnecessary services of additional attorney) and $35,105 (reduction for "expenses
relating to the polygraph testing of [one of the co-plaintiffs]"), for a total reduction of $463,825).
115 Whether an infringement case is likely to succeed on the merits is often a secondary
consideration for attorneys offering their litigation services on a contingency basis. See Dee Gill,
Defending Your Rights: ProtectingIntellectualPropertyis Expensive -- and Often Crucial,WALL ST.
J., § 6, Sept. 25, 2000. Rather, many firms seek "big collectible damages." Id. One attorney
explained that his firm looks for "a history of improper sales by the other party at least in the tens of
thousands of dollars." Id. A new patent does not usually protect a product with a sales history that
would justify damages large enough to attract contingency representation: "There has to be a pot of
gold at the end of the rainbow ...." Id.
116 See DAVID A. BURGE,PATENT AND TRADEMARK TACTICS AND PRACTICE 47-48 (Wiley 3d ed.
1999).
117 AIPLA 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that in 2002 the median charge for a
patent novelty search was $1,500).
118 Gary Myers, Litigationas a PredatoryPractice,80 KY. L.J. 565, 590-91 (1992).
A target [company] may be forced to divulge proprietary information, such as
trade secrets, new product developments, and marketing strategies in the course
of discovery. While a suit is pending, the target [company] may also be forced to
disclose its contingent liability to creditors, accountants, and others.
This
revelation would hamper its ability to obtain the funds necessary to compete.
Id. A defendant in one patent case claimed that adverse trial publicity concerning his products'
alleged infringement caused a loss of potential customers, the failure of a proposed joint venture and
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1. PriorArt Search
A search of the prior art, credited in the documentation of an issued patent,1 19 is
120
a prudent precautionary measure to ensure the future validity of one's patent.
Because such searches are not obligatory 121 and generally vary in cost
1
proportionately to their scope, most are limited so as to keep costs at a minimum.

22

As a result, many prior art searches fail to discover relevant, pre-existing
innovations. 123 But even when the search for prior art is limited, an opinion based on
the findings may cost upwards of $10,000.124

2. Drafting& Proseeution-Related Costs
A patent application is required to describe the invention, explain how to make
and use it and "particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter [of
the] .

.

. invention," 125 among other descriptive elements. 126 A patent's claims are the

critical elements of the application, asserting the purpose of the invention and
defining the extent of protection. 127 The application should be prepared and
prosecuted by an agent or attorney registered with the USPTO1 2S and generally will
129
cost between $5,500 and $10,000, depending on the complexity of the invention.
his company's failure to obtain financing for other ventures. Handgards, Inc. v Ethicon, Inc., 743
F.2d 1282, 1296 (9th Cir. 1984).
11 9
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1302.12 (8th ed., rev. 2, 2004).
120 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966).
121 Lemley, supra note 9, at 1500.
122 BURGE, supra note 116, at 47.
123 Id. at 48. A search may still fail to uncover a pertinent reference. Id. Seven percent of the
references stored at the USPTO are missing or misfiled. Id. Furthermore, documents may be
removed to examiners' personal files and thus may be absent from the searchable content. Id. Any
search at all, however, is still optional. Lemley, supra note 9, at 1500.
124 Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposalto Shore up the Foundationsof Patent
Law that the UnderwaterLine Eroded,20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 721, 740 (1998). "A reliable
patent opinion costs at least $10,000 if the patent has any real complexity." -d.
125 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-.75 (2004).
126 BURGE, supra note 116, at 53 (stating that drawings, details critical to the practice of the
invention, questions about the character of the invention, and claims to the invention's scope of
patent protection are among these elements).
127 See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.75.
128 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.31, 11.6-.10 (2004).
Patent applications may be filed pro se (by the
inventor himself), but all inventors' representatives must be registered with the USPTO. Id. § 1.31.
Patent prosecution, a term of art describing the process of obtaining a patent, see id. (stating that
"[a]n applicant for patent may file and prosecute his or her own case" (emphasis added)), generally is
performed by an individual registered with USPTO as a patent attorney or patent agent. See id.
Although attorney fees may be minimized by the inventor's drafting a majority of the patent
application, an attorney provides more protection. See Seabrook, supra note 83, at 50. As Jerry
Lamelson, a prodigious inventor, advised:
It takes great skill to craft a patent application ....
You have to stake the four
corners of your invention broadly enough so that they give you maximum
protection . . . . Of course, if you write it too broadly you may invalidate your
claim, because it will read on prior art. But if you write too narrowly you may
miss the thing about the technology that turns out to be truly valuable.
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Additionally, responses often must be filed and rejections addressed when
questions arise or errors are discovered upon review by the USPTO. 3 0 For example,
where a response includes the addition of a claim, the applicant is charged only a
statutory fee, 131 but the legal costs of drafting the response are far higher in
comparison.13 2 Indeed, a response inclusive of an amendment and/or argument
generally will cost between $1,500 and $2,800, depending on the complexity of the
133
invention and the amendment and/or argument.

3. Opportunity Costs & Intellectual Capital
A small entity or individual inventor also must factor into the litigation equation
the loss of opportunities to pursue other activities. One study has found that the
average suit lasts for 1.12 years134 while another found the average suit to last 1.39
years in cases where no preliminary injunction is sought.13 5 Small companies whose
officers must devote substantial portions of that time to the defense of a patent are
removed from the process of running their businesses.13 6 Individual inventors are
particularly impacted by this cost, as anyone who works for himself will have
difficulty earning income while away from his business, notwithstanding the
inevitable attorney fees.137 Moreover, the loss of intellectual capital while an

Id.
129 AIPLA 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (stating that in 2002 the median charge for an
"[o]riginal non-provisional application [for an] invention of minimal complexity" was $5,504 and an
"[o]riginal application [for a] relatively complex biotech/chemical" invention was $10,001).
1:3037 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2004); Harold C. Wegner, COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 283 (1991) (stating
it is very rare that no response is required during the USPTO application process).
131 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(b) (2004). For example, a small entity amending an application to include
an additional claim is charged $44 (assuming the application previously included three or more
claims). See id.
1:32AIPLA 2003 REPORT, supra note 4, at 21.
133 Id. (stating that in 2002 the median charge for an '[a]pplication amendment [and/or]
argument of minimal complexity" was $1,499 and an '[aipplication amendment [and/or] argument
[for a] relatively complex biotech/chemical" invention was $2,806).
134 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovaton? , 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 908 (2001).
135 Jean 0. Lanjouw & Joshua Lerner, Tilting the Table: The Use ofPreliminaryInjunctions,
44 J.L. & Econ. 573, 595-96 tbl.3 (2001).
136 Charles L. Gholz, First-to-Fileor First-to-Invent2 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 891,
894-95 (2000). One company involved in litigation assigned their lead inventor to the litigation
process full-time, concluding that a favorable outcome in the suit was more important than his
inventiveness. Id. This probably occurs more often than not, regardless of a company's size, and is
but one instance of litigation effecting a decrease in a company's ability to innovate. One study
shows that large companies are often represented by in-house counsel, which results in lower
litigation costs and thus places such parties at an advantage. Jonathan P. Bellis & Bernard H.
Gustin, Comparingthe Cost of Outside and Inside Counsel,8 CORP. COUNS. Q. 80 (1992).
1:37See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., No. 87-140-CMW,
1990 WL 146385, at *1-2 (D. Del. July 31, 1990).
Fees for in-house counsel are appropriate only when counsel is performing
legal work that would otherwise be performed by outside counsel; time spent by
in-house counsel in the role of a client, such as time spent keeping abreast of the
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inventor is occupied in litigation is difficult, if not impossible, to measure. These
costs are intangible and difficult to account; thus, even if the small business or
inventor is awarded damages, it is unlikely that such losses will be replaced.

4. FinancialConsiderations
When legal representation on a contingency basis is unavailable, the small
entity may incur the additional costs associated with borrowing the money necessary
to finance litigation. 13 8 Yet, instead of being applied to the costs of litigation, the
small inventor likely would be better served using such financial resources to finance
other, for-profit activities. In addition, where patent litigation is used to stall a
competitor's entry into a market-such as through one party's moving for a
preliminary injunction against the sale of the other's product-the delay creates a
139
cost that is not awarded to the non-movant if later victorious.

5. Expert Fees
Most patent cases require one or more expert witnesses to simplify for the jury
and judge the complex technical issues often involved. 140 While the patent statutes
allow attorney fees to be awarded in "exceptional cases," 141 case law has held that
awards for expert witness fees must be limited to the statutory witness fee of $40 per
day, 142 except when fraud is perpetrated against the court or one of the parties
progress of the litigation and advising outside counsel of the client's views as to
litigation strategy, is not compensable in a fee award.
Id.; see also Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447, 454 (D. Conn. 1970) (stating
that in-house counsel generally is viewed as "a regular cost of doing business" when calculating
attorney fees).
138 See Susan Lorder Martin, Financing Plaintiffs Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and
Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 79-83 (2000). At least one corporation has formed to
finance patent infringement lawsuits. Id. They do so by buying an interest in the patent and
joining the original patent holder in the case, thereby becoming entitled to a share of the award. Id.
This option, however, may result in a small entity waiving its status as a small entity under 37
C.F.R. § 1.28(a)(1)-(3), (5) (2004).
1:39Gary Myers, Litigationas a PredatoryPractice,80 KY. L.J. 565, 590-91 (1992).
140 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. Ampex Corp., 190 F.3d 1300, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto .... ").
Experts for both sides testified to the meaning of various technical terms .... the
scope of the claims as applied to the accused device, the content of the prior art,
the relation of the patented technology to the prior art, and other aspects relating
to both validity and infringement. The issues at trial, and indeed on appeal, were
complex in fact and law.
Mitsubish-hi 190 F.3d at 1302-03.
HI' 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000); see also Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(interpreting § 285 to provide for the award of expert witness fees when three criteria were met: (1)
the case must be exceptional, (2) the expert testimony was necessary, and (3) the expert fees must be
reasonable).
142 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (2000).
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commits 'acts which degrade the judicial system."' 143

This amount is only a tiny

fraction of the true cost of an expert witness. 144 Such a differential imposed by a
court severely curtails the return a small business or inventor can expect from a
successful suit to protect its patent rights.
In addition to expert witnesses retained for their technical testimony, patent
cases often require damages experts to calculate and explain reasonable royalties,
lost profits or some combination thereof. 145 "Frequently the issue is simply how
much will be awarded and a liability victory with a bad damages expert can mean a
low award." 146

These experts are typically Certified Professional Accountants or

economists and can add substantially to the litigant's total expenditure for the
assistance of experts. 147 Technical and damages-related expert witnesses should be
engaged early in the litigation process, regardless of whether the case goes to trial, as

148
the data they provide often lead to a settlement.
Most inventors and small businesses are probably not so naive as to believe that
a patent truly will allow them to profit from their invention unhindered by
competition. 149 But in the aggregate, the costs facing the "little guy" to protect his
patents against infringement can be insurmountable, while remaining nothing more
than the proverbial "drop in the bucket" for a large corporation.

D. A voiding the Costs of PatentProtection
Litigation costs, in conjunction with the other, less tangible costs necessary to
enforce patent rights, act as a disincentive for small entities to patent their
innovations. In the example of John Q. Public, unless market success is a certainty,
a small inventor such as Mr. Public is not likely to seek patent protection for his
143

Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Casting Co., 23 F.3d. 374, 376-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)). In Amsted, the Federal Circuit held
that the lack of an express provision for expert witness fees in 35 U.S.C. § 285 limited such
witnesses to the statutory fee provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b)-leaving the plaintiff to pay the
$146,000 expert fee despite the lower court's judgment that the defendant infringed the plaintiffs
patent, "lacked a good faith belief that the ... patent was invalid" before filing suit and "burdened
the court with numerous motions." Id.
144 One patent agent offers a variety of patent services and provides a summary of fees
indicating proposed expert witness fees of $380 per hour. See Registered PatentAgent Year 2004
Schedule of Fees, at http://www.webpatent.com/costs.htm (last visited Nov. 09, 2004). Such a rate
would result in a net loss of $2,720 per eight-hour day if only the $40 per hour statutory fee were
awarded. Some factors contributing to the high cost of expert witnesses are their "extensive postgraduate educations and impressive backgrounds," as well as the significant amount of time
required to become familiar with the issues in a case. Daniel W. McDonald & Matthew A. Doscotch,

Why Aren't Expert Fees Recoverable in Patent Cases? Correcting an Anomaly in the Patent Fee
Statutes, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 255, 265 (2002).
145 Slobodin & Shaw, supra note 104, at 669.
'16 Id. at 683.
147 Id. at 682.
"1 Id. at 687.
19 See Laura Lane & Michael Koryta, It's Patently Hard to Profit from Ideas, Many Don't
Earn Back Cost of Obtaining Rights, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 2004, § 1. Robert Humbert, vice president
of the Indiana Inventors Association, estimated that only one in 400 patents earns even the costs of
obtaining the patent, not to mention the extra cost to protect it. Id.
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invention when the cost to maintain a patent exceeds his income by 800%. For this
reason, many small inventors may opt for other forms of protection, such as trade
secret protection, or even no protection at all.150 In contrast to patents, trade secrets
essentially may be had and maintained for free. 15 1 However, trade secret protection
152
essentially is worthless if the protected innovation loses its status as a secret.
Thus, as in cases where new discoveries are intentionally unprotected and disclosed
to the public, 153 a trade secret revealed has the undesirable effect of depriving the
innovator of his status as the sole economic beneficiary of his (formerly secret)
innovation.1 54 In addition, the very nature of trade secret protection undercuts the
intent of the patent system because innovations kept as trade secrets do not readily
become available for others to build upon.1 55 If sufficiently high, the costs of patent
protection for small entities conceivably could outweigh the benefits of the patent
system. Such an imbalance likely would prompt such parties to reduce the number
of patents applied for and, concomitantly, their important contributions to innovation
1 56
in general.

III. PROPOSAL
Given the impact made by small businesses on the U.S. economy, a reduction in
the number of innovations contributed to society by small businesses and inventors is
a pressing concern.1 57 While many people empathize with small businesses and
supra note 74. In Illinois, for example, a trade secret consists of
information, including but not limited to, technical or non-technical data, a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing,
process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, that:
(1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2(d) (2004). One study found that many manufacturing companies
consider patents less effective than secrecy when it comes to protecting their intellectual property.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 57, at 2104.
'5' See JOHN G. MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4.23 (2d ed. 2004).
152 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2(d); see also id. § 1065/4 (providing damages for the
misappropriation of trade secrets).
153 One prominent example would be the current trend in "open source" software code. See,
e.g., Open Source Initiative, at http://www.opensource.org/ (last visited Nov. 09, 2004) (describing
the requirements for open source software). The idea behind open source software is that constant
public disclosure of the improvements, adaptations and repairs made by many individuals vastly
accelerates the pace at which software can be developed. Id.
154 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/2(d)(1) (requiring that information kept as a trade secret be
"sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use").
155See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
156See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing several of the important inventions for
which small inventors were responsible).
157See generally Cora Daniels, When a Big Firm Took Their Idea, this Couple Fought Back:
Small Business Rip-off FORTUNE SMALL Bus., Nov. 13, 2001, available at http://www.fortune.com/
fortune/print/0,15935,359100,00.html (last visited Nov. 09, 2004). Richard Apley, who is in charge
of independent inventor and small-business issues as a director at the USPTO, stated that "his office
150 See POSNER,
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inventors because of their "underdog" status, sound economic policy coincides with
that emotion and requires protective measures exceeding those currently in place.
Under the current legal system, a future reduction in the diversity of disclosed
innovations seems very likely. Large corporations with prodigious research and
development budgets cannot be expected to develop innovations in areas where only
a marginal profit is foreseen. 158 Technologies unlikely to produce large initial returns
typically fall into the domain of small businesses. 159 This section discusses several
free-market and legislation-based proposals to remedy the plight of the small entity
160
patentee and check the potential for a decline in American innovation.

A. The "Ultra-Small"Entity
The first proposal involves the creation of an "ultra-small" entity category, which
would include individual inventors and those companies having perhaps fifty
employees or less. The current upper limit for small-entity status, 500 employees,
hardly characterizes a company unable to fund an infringement suit in defense of its
patent rights. 161 A company with the ability to meet the payroll requirements
necessary to employ 500 workers likely has the financial capability to finance all but
the most drawn-out patent litigation. Inventions made by ultra-small entities,
however, are those most at risk of existing in an undisclosed state due to the ultimate
expense of patent protection. Therefore, the suggestions in this section should apply
to companies which not only meet the size requirement stated above, but have a net
income falling below a certain level, perhaps $1 million.162
Already, the SBA has a classification for a "very small business." 163 Among
other requirements, this classification could provide the company-size and income
limit parameters used by the USPTO to establish inventors' ultra-small entity
status. 164 The very small business designation would apply to individual inventors,
as well as the numerous small businesses that innovate less through research and
development than during the ordinary course of business. Once a party establishes
that it meets the additional requirements to be recognized as an ultra-small entity, it
would enjoy a waiver of a portion or all of the fees required by the USPTO to file and
now receives a half dozen calls a day from firms that say they are being ripped off by bigger
companies." Apley further stated-in jest-that 'it has gotten so bad that I'm thinking of asking
the EPA if we can list the individual inventor on the endangered species list." Id.
158 Soo Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economies ofPatentScope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 873, 916 n.143 (1990).
159 Id.
160 The proposed solutions are presented without the thorough economic analysis that may be
required to determine if the implementation of one or more ultimately would be practical.
16137 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(2)(ii) (2004) (referring to the size requirements of 13 C.F.R. § 121.802);
13 C.F.R. § 121.802 ('A concern eligible for reduced patent fees is one . .. [w]hose number of
employees, including affiliates, does not exceed 500 persons .... ").
102 E.g, 13 C.F.R. § 121.413 (2004). Section 121.413 is an SBA regulation defining a "very

small business" as a concern with no more than fifteen employees and less than $1 million in annual
receipts. Id.
163 Id. The "very small business" designation exists for certain preferential treatment in
government contracts. Id. at § 121.401.
164 See id. § 121.413.
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process a patent application. 165 Thereafter, the waived fees only would be imposed on
the ultra-small entity when it became able to recoup those costs through licensing or
similar arrangements. 166 However, considering the total cost of litigation, the
USPTO's reduced fees for small entities already are relatively low. 167 Thus, standing
alone, a further reduction in USPTO fees for ultra-small entities (even to effectively
nothing!) probably would not offer a sufficient additional incentive for such entities to
seek patent protection for their innovations, especially those of a non-commercial
168
nature or that would be difficult to commercialize.

B.

Tax Benefits

A second proposal is to lower the marginal income-tax rate paid by attorneys on
income earned while representing small-business patent applicants and patentees. If
the current tax rate is assumed to be thirty percent, John Q. Public's attorney would
be required to pay $6,000 to the Internal Revenue Service for Mr. Public's $20,000
legal fee. A lower rate of ten percent applied to the same legal fee increases the
attorney's profit by $4,000 for the representation. The theory of supply and demand
suggests that this savings would result in lower billing rates for small businesses-or
at least compel attorneys to view small clients more favorably, considering the
increased profits that would flow from the tax benefit. 169 One criticism that may
arise from this proposal is the loss of federal income resulting from the reduced rate;
however, it is possible that such a concern may dissipate in view of the economic
growth likely to be spurred by the manufacture and sale of patented products.

15 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the basic costs for a small entity to file,
have issued and maintain a patent with the USPTO).
16 Enforcement of this proposal could be achieved by treating filing costs as a debt, to be

temporarily waived for each fiscal year until tax returns indicate gains from the patent. In addition,
similar to any contractual relationship, such a system would impose on the patentee a good faith
requirement to actually seek out arrangements by which to profit from the applied-for patent(s).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each

party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.").

A likely

drawback to such a system would be the requirement that the USPTO develop the capabilities to
handle the collection and acceptance of deferred fees and police applicants who fail to pay after they
have the capability to do so.
167 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (identifying the average cost of filing a patent
application as only 1.48% of the average cost of litigation).
168 The term "non-commercial" is used here to describe those patents that may not produce

revenues in excess of their filing fees. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,429,685 (issued Feb. 7, 1984)
(describing a method for growing unicorns); U.S. Patent No. 5,971,829 (issued Oct. 26, 1999)
(describing a motorized ice-cream cone).
'69 But see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.l (1984) ("[D]etermining an appropriate
market rate' for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and
most services are determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense there is no such thing
as a prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers ....").
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C. Expert Witness Fees
1 70
Although costs for experts usually are incurred prior to any settlement,
experts are virtually indispensable in patent litigation. 171 Nonetheless, every hour
billed by the expert diminishes the patent holder's profits. To the small patentee, the
likelihood of having to pay for an expert's services during infringement litigation
provides yet another reason to avoid the expense of entering the patent system.
Thus, a third proposal is to amend 35 U.S.C. § 285 to allow not only "reasonable
attorney fees," but also reasonable expert witness fees. 172 However, unlike the
current threshold for awards of attorney fees, the threshold for awarding expert
witness fees under a modified § 285 would be the same as the willfulness standard
often used by courts in deciding whether to award treble damages under § 284.173
Thus, as proposed, a modified § 285 would permit the full amount of reasonable
expert witness fees to be awarded to the plaintiff where it can prove the defendant
174
committed acts of willful infringement.

D. Attorney Fees
A fourth proposal involves discarding the policy of reducing attorney fees to a
"reasonable" rate when such fees are granted.1 75 Where it cannot be determined that
170 Settlement often occurs during or immediately after discovery, at such time as both parties
have evaluated the available evidence and, as a result, the other party's likelihood of success. See,
e.g., Doctors Co. v. Vincent, 98 P.3d 681, 685 (Nev. 2004) (stating that "[s]hortly before trial, based
upon the potentially negative evidence that surfaced during discovery, [the appellant, Doctors Co.
(originally a co-defendant with Vincent),] settled with [the original plaintiff] for $2.75 million").
Moreover, in difficult intellectual property cases, expert testimony often is required even during
discovery.
See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing expert testimony given during discovery in a suit for copyright, trademark and trade
dress infringement).
See Eldon Indus., Inc. v. Vanier Mfg., Inc., No. CV 86-7521 RSWL, 1990 WL 160220, at *2
S71
(C.D. Cal. Jan 8, 1990) (stating that "[e]xpert witnesses are practically a requirement in patent
litigation").
1 2 See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). One criticism of this proposal is the unbalanced power that it
could afford to large opponents who choose to employ costly expert witnesses. A potential solution
may be found in requiring the parties (or more likely the court) to set the allowable witness rate by
stipulation prior to discovery. Parties that inflate witness fees to intimidate an opponent in this
scheme, would be liable for payment of the same inflated fee to a victor.
173 See id. § 284.
[A] trial court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees in patent cases may be
invoked only upon a finding of bad faith or unequitable conduct on the part of the
losing party which would make it grossly unjust for the prevailing party to be left
with the burden of his litigation expenses.
Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 546 F.2d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1963). Arguably, the standard
articulated in Ga-rbo]] is higher than the willfulness standard currently used by federal courts to
assess whether treble damages should be awarded in a given case. See cases cited supra note 48.
See gon-rally JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 331-32 (2003) (stating that
awards of enhanced damages under § 284 and awards of attorney fees under § 285 "are not
necessarily linked; however, the grant of one does not preclude the denial of the other").
171See, e.g., cases cited supranote 48.
175 See 35 U.S.C. § 285.
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an attorney acted in bad faith when establishing a fee schedule at the outset of
representation, the agreed-upon rates should be used as the basis for damages,
without reduction by the court. Such a policy would serve both as a deterrent for
infringers and an incentive for attorneys to represent small businesses. 176 Infringers
will be deterred by the possibility of higher damages awards, and attorneys will
realize a greater return on time spent representing small businesses or individuals.
For patentees, the current policy of reducing awards of attorney fees resembles a
penalty-one which deters both small and large entities that seek "routine"
protection of their intellectual property. 177

E. Reduced Billing Rates and Pro Bono Representation
Another proposal is to require a reduced rate for hours billed while representing
small businesses during the patent application process and patent litigation. 178 This
requirement could be made a condition of maintaining a patent bar license. 179 By
reducing filing fees, the USPTO already has assisted small-entity inventors in the
patent prosecution process. However, litigation, by far the most insurmountable cost
of patent ownership, currently is practiced by attorneys who need not be registered
with the USPTO.180 Thus, some level of USPTO regulation also should be imposed
upon patent litigators as a condition precedent to being permitted to litigate patent
cases. Such regulation could include the requirement that attorneys provide small
18 1
entities with a designated amount of pro bono or discounted representation.

176 Would-be infringers may be deterred by the billing rates of an opponent's attorney(s) if the
assumption that § 285 at most would permit an award of reasonable rates-beneficial to a willful
infringer-was no longer valid.
177 See supra note 114.
178 See Valerie Calloway, In the Process of Controvertingits ConstitutionallyGiven Purpose,
The US. PatentSystem DiscriminatesAgainst Inventors with Limited FinancialMeans, 11 LAW &
INEQ. 565 (1993) (proposing pro bono requirements in addition to a waiver of USPTO application
fees for inventors with limited means).
179 Id. at 579.
180 Only those attorneys engaged in the prosecution of patent applications must be registered

with the USPTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (2004).
181 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2003) ('A lawyer should aspire to
render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year."). A counterargument to the
proposed regulatory scheme is that it is tantamount to government-mandated subsidization of small
businesses by patent litigators. Thus, it presents the foreseeable problem of higher billing rates.
Eventually, these costs would be passed on to all consumers and, as a result, may serve to hinder
innovation as much as assist it.
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F Inventor's Associationsand PatentInsurance
Yet another proposal involves encouraging small entities to join inventors'
associations. Such associations have the power to negotiate for lower-cost "patent
insurance" on their members' behalf.18 2 A number of underwriters offer policies
covering both the cost to defend against an accusation of infringement and the cost to
attack infringers.183 But coverage is somewhat expensive, and the policy must be
purchased before any infringement is known to have occurred.18 4 Nonetheless, the
expense of maintaining such insurance, which starts at a minimum of $1,300 per
year,18 5 is a modest price to pay considering the high litigation costs that a small
business may face.18 6 Similar to many other forms of insurance, the cost of patent
insurance could be further reduced if purchased in blocks; for example, through an
inventor's association.
Readily available patent insurance may provide a key strategic advantage to
small patentees who seek to enforce their patent rights. Therefore, in addition to
better rates negotiated by associations, government involvement also could be sought
to improve the business climate for patent insurance. Indeed, Congress has taken
steps in the past to improve the economic feasibility of ventures deemed important to
society at large; specifically, Internet-based commerce.187 In order to encourage the
growth of commerce on the internet, Congress in 1998 enacted the Internet Tax
Freedom Act, which provided for a temporary moratorium on the states' taxation of
electronic commerce.188 Similar to the financial benefits that the Internet Tax
Freedom Act bestowed upon companies doing business on the internet, governmentapproved tax benefits or subsidies designed to benefit companies providing patent
insurance likely would prove potent catalysts for the growth of the industry and lead
to lower policy costs through competition.

182

See Frances H. Miller, Health Insurance PurchasingAlliances." Monopsony Threat o-r

Procompetitivo fX for Health Sector Ills:, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1546 (1994) (discussing the influence

of purchasing alliances in the health care insurance market).
183 Soo Gill, supra note 115, § 6.
18' See Bruce E. Burdick, Patent Insurance, is it Worth it? (2002), at http://www.members.
tripod.com/burdicklawfirm/insurart.htm (last visited Nov. 09, 2004). In general, premiums for
patent insurance cost approximately two to five percent of the insured amount with co-payments
from fifteen to twenty-five percent. Id.
185 Telephone Interview with Bob Fletcher, Intellectual Property Insurance Services

Corporation (Oct. 5, 2004). A patent insurance policy from Intellectual Property Insurance Services

Corporation costs, in general, $7-12 per $1,000 of coverage. Id.
186

See supra note 4 (identifying a range of legal fees related to litigation).

See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1100(a), 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998),
amended by, Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 107-75, § 2, 115 Stat. 703 (2001).
188 See id. As originally enacted, the Internet Tax Freedom Act mandated that no state could
levy taxes against Internet-based commercial transactions for a "period beginning on October 1,
187

1998, and ending 3 years after [the Act's passage into law on October 21, 1998]." Id. § 1100(a).

Thus, the Act's taxation moratorium was to have ended on October 21, 2001. Id. However,
Congress later chose to extend the effectiveness of the Act until November 1, 2003. Internet Tax
Nondiscrimination Act § 2.
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G. Arbitration
A final-although perhaps more obvious-proposal is the encouragement of
arbitration in lieu of litigation to determine patent rights. 189 Arbitration is not a new
solution to patent disputes; in fact, the arbitration of patent rights currently is
allowed by statute: 35 U.S.C. § 294.190 Modifying § 294 to require small-entity
litigants to engage their adversaries in non-binding, appealable arbitration as a
mandatory prelude to litigation would serve a gate-keeping function, disposing of
frivolous and predatory suits without the costs of formal judicial system. Indeed, a
substantial reduction in expert witness fees and litigation costs can be realized by the
limited discovery schedule usually mandated by arbitration. Moreover, in contrast to
traditional litigation, arbitration has the advantages of being faster, cheaper and
more private. 191
Although these advantages may allow for less expensive dispute resolution,
192
arbitration would erode some of the protection provided by the formal legal system.
Therefore, arbitration under a modified § 294 might be reserved for cases in which
one party's financial resources exceed the other party's resources by some statutorily
set ratio.1 93 In that way, arbitration would not apply per se to a party qualifying as a
small entity but having sufficient revenue to finance a suit against a large adversary.
189 This suggestion has previously been recommended to Congress:
The AIPLA Committee on Legislative Priorities proposed a special Limited Claim
Practice for small patent cases so that litigants in such cases could get a prompt
decision. It defined "small" cases as those in which the plaintiff sought damages of
less than $1 million and no injunctive relief.
Jerome G. Lee, President's Page, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N BULL. 186-87 (Dec. 1990). The
proposed procedure would strictly control discovery, preclude a jury, limit each party to three
witnesses and mandate a total trial length of no more than four days. Id.
190 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2000). Section 294 provides for voluntary arbitration of patent cases:
A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a
provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or
infringement arising under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the
parties to an existing patent validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing
to settle such dispute by arbitration. Any such provision or agreement shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any grounds that exist at law or in
equity for revocation of a contract.
Id.
191 As James F. Henry, President of the Center for Public Resources, stated: "In an era when
product lives are measured in months and litigation is measured in decades, you can't afford
litigation." Deborah L. Jacobs, ControllingLitigation Costs with a Neutral Third Party,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1990, § 3, at 12. Most arbitration hearings are private affairs; they are not reported or
published, thereby concealing any trade secrets or license agreements from the public. Kevin R.
Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 5 (1993). Binding
arbitration of a given patent dispute may cost 50-85% less than a trial held to resolve the same
dispute. Tom Arnold, FundamentalsofAlternative Dispute Resolution: Why PreferADR, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1993, at 655, 669 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No. 376, 1993), available atWL, 376 PLI/Pat 655.
192 Soe Leo Kanowitz, Alternate Dispute Resolution and the Pubhlie Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 252 (1987) (discussing the criticism that arbitration does not
embody a judge's interpretation of constitutional and statutory values).
193 In the example of X Corp and John Q. Public, the ratio of the parties' net incomes is 200 to
1. The proposed mandatory arbitration should be triggered by a much closer ratio, such as 10 to 1.
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The statutory ratio would be set so as to ensure financial risk for the speculative
party and help eliminate concessions made by small entities facing enormous legal
fees to defend a legitimate position.

IV. CONCLUSION

The goal of the U.S. Patent system is to induce innovation through the
disclosure of developed ideas. The patent system accomplishes its ends by offering a
term of protection to innovative ideas so as to help make them profitable. But the
ability of the small-entity inventor to obtain and enforce patent rights is becoming an
increasingly difficult financial burden to bear. The extreme cost of protecting a
patent through litigation may result in fewer patents filed by small entities and thus
less innovation. A deceleration in the pace of patent filing harms the economy and
undermines the very means by which the U.S. Patent system fosters scientific
discovery.
Small-entity inventors do not deserve special patent protection simply because of
their economic disadvantages. Rather, our society should take the steps necessary to
level the legal playing field for small entities because they have consistently made
innovative contributions to society in ways that large corporations likely never will.
Unless small entities can afford to enforce their patent rights, such contributions
may simply cease to exist.

